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RECENT CASES
Experience has shown that the social and political overtones arising from
the assertion of the constitutional privilege generally constitute an effective
deterent to its exercise. But where they do not, the mere assertion of Fifth
Amendment rights should not be made a substitute for competent evidence
as the basis of a declaration of professional unfitness.
HAROLD W. E. ANDERSON
DIVORCE - DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY - WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION BENE-
FITS - Plaintiff obtained a divorce from her husband, the defendant, in a
community property state. In effectuating a division of the community prop-
e rty, the court awarded to the defendant all of the weekly workman's com-
pensation benefits he had been drawing following a totally and permanently
disabling injury sustained during coverture. Plaintiff appealed this award on
the ground that the weekly compensation benefits were paid the defendant in
lieu of wages and since wages were community assets, she was entitled to
share them with the defendant. The court held that the award be affirned.
Workmen's compensation benefits were not a part of the community prop-
erty, but were personal to the defendant and his separate property. Rich-
ards v. Richards, 59 N. M. 308, 283 P.2d 881 (1955).
The origin of the community property system has never been positively
determined,1 but its foothold in the United States was gained in those sectors of
the country originally under Spanish domination.* Because it was not a part
of the common law, it has survived only by statute.:' In a community prop-
erty state all property acquired by the husband or wife during the marital
relationship is a part of the community, except that received by gift, inheri-
tance, or devise,4 which is normally deemed the separate property of the re-
cipient as is that belonging to either before marrige.5
It appears that of the eight states6 using the community system four,- have
dealt directly with the problem in the principle case. Generally, damages re-
ceived as compensation for injuries to either the husband" or wife" are held
to fall into the community as property acquired during the marriage. This was
the theory adopted by the Arizona court in deciding that the benefits of work-
1. Garazi v. Dastas, 204 U. S. 64, 78 (1907) (dictum).
2. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897).
3. Nelson v. Nelson, 149 Minn. 285, 183 N.W. 354 (1921); Pridemore v. Duncan,
146 Okla. 70, 293 Pac. 266 (1930).
4. Wharburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484 (1900); Pedder v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.,
60 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932); Myer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 248 (1859).
5. Woods v. Maimy 69 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1934); Merren v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 51 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1931); Worden v. Worden, 96 Wash. 592, 165 Pac. 501
(1917).
6. 2 Tiffaney, Real Property, §437 (3rd Ed. 1939).
7. E.g. Dawson v. McNaney, 71 Ariz. 79, 223 P.2d 907 (1950); Northwestren Red-
wood Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 184 Call. 484, 194 Pac. 31 (1920); Brownfield
v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940); Pickens v. Pickens, 125
Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951 (1935).
8. Cavagnaro v. Delmas, 29 Cal. App.2d 352, 84 P.2d 274 (1938); Southwestern
Engraving Co. of Dallas v. Hansen, 72 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Flowers v.
Smith, 80 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (dictum) (Damages for slander were
held to be a part of the community). Contra Fredrickson & Watson Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev.
117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940).
9. Cavagnaro v. Delmas, 29 Cal. App.2d 352, 84 P.2d 274 (1938); Swager v. Peterson,
49 Idaho 785, 291 Pac. 1049 (1930); Taylor v. Catalen, 140 Tex. 38, 166 S.W.2d 102,
101 (1940) (dictum).
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man's compensation law were a part of the community.'l In reaching the
same result, Californiat and Texas' 2 considered the benefits as awarded in
lieu of wages.
Louisiana, alone, has held that the benefits are not a part of the com-
munity.1 3 The court concluded that the purpose of the statute is to provide a
means of subsistence to the employee while his earning capacity has been
partially or wholly destroyed by injury received in the course of his em-
ployment.
Division of property has been defined in a separate property state as an
adjustment of property rights and equities between the parties and is clearly
distinguishable in purpose from alimony and support money which may also
b6 granted.14 In the instant case the defendant, 65 years of age, was per-
manently disabled. The plaintiff was a stenographer and bookkeeper, in
good health, and employed at the time of the suit. If these same facts should
arise in a separate property state it appears that the wife would have little
success in attempting to impound any part of the benefits awarded the hus-
band by the workman's compensation act.
North Dakota has held that the ultimate object to be sought in property
division in a divorce action is an equitable distribution" depending upon
factsi and circumstances.' Our code substantially reiterates this precept 17 and
provides with respect to workman's compensation awards that the payments
shall go to the employee and only on his death to his dependents."
Should North Dakota, not being a community property state, have to deal
with a property settlement such as that in the instant case, the compensation
awards of the husband would merely be taken into consideration along with
his other assets when making a property settlement or alimony decree.
FRED E. WHISENAND Jn.
HOMIICIDE - MURDER - THE FELONY-MURDER RULE - Defendant and his
accomplice fled after robbing a store. The storekeeper pursued the accomp-
lice and killed him. Upon defendant's trial for the murder of his accomplice
it was held that a co-felon can be found guilty of murder of his accomplice
under the felony murder rule' where the victim of an armed robbery justifi-
10. Dawson v. McNaney, 71 Ariz. 79, 223 P.2d 907 (1950).
11. Northwestern Redwood Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 184 Cal. 484, 194
Pac. 31 (1920); Doyle v. Doyle, 44 Cal. App. 259, 186 Pac. 188, 190 (1919) (dictum).
12. Pickens v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951 (1935).
13. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
14. Brackob v. Brackob, 262 Wis. 202, 54 N.W.2d 900, 903 (1952).
15. Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952).
16. Id. at 784, 52 N.W.2d at 111 (such as the respective ages of the parties, earning
ability, conduct of the parties, station in life, health and physical condition, 5nancial cir-
cunstances as shown by their property, and all other matters pertaining to the case).
17. N. D. Rev. Code §14-0524 (1943): "When a divorce is granted, the court shall
make such equitable distribution of the real and personal property of the parties as :nay
seem just and' proper, and may compel either of the parties to provide for the mainten-
ance of the children of the marriage, and to make such suitable allowances to the other
party for support during life or for a shorter period as the court may deem just, having
regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively. The court from time to time may
modify its orders in these respects."
18. N. D. Rev. Code §65-0505 (1943).
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §4701 (1939): "All murder . . . which shall be committed
in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any arson, rape, burglary, or kidnap-
ping, shall be murder in the first degree."
